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Economic Conversation: Converting Tanks in Indiana 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Since the summer of 1984, the Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs has been involved in a public 
campaign to save the Blaw-Knox plant in the Calumet steel region of Northwest Indiana. The process of 
organizing the campaign for conversion of the plant has been both difficult and challenging. There is 
precious little American experience to draw on for such an effort, and when the campaign, to its credit, 
attracted support from a broad range of concerned parties, it was hard to keep labor and community 
interests in the forefront. 
Based on our trials and errors, we would like to offer some practical insights for the benefit of others who 
may become involved in similar campaigns. We highly recommend union and community involvement in 
such efforts. If working people and community groups are to gain power in saving manufacturing jobs 
and developing this country's future industrial policy we need to seize every opportunity for involving 
ourselves in local economic development decision-making. 
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USWA 1026 was initially alerted to the potential plant closing at Blaw-
Knox by an article in a trade journal which is monitored by the Calumet 
Project for Industrial Jobs. White Consolidated, Blaw-Knox's parent, 
continued for six months to deny that it was unloading the plant. 
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• Greg LeRoy & Lynn Feekin 
Since the summer of 1984, the Calumet Project for Industrial 
Jobs has been involved in a public campaign to save the Blaw-Knox 
plant in the Calumet steel region of Northwest Indiana. The 
process of organizing the campaign for conversion of the plant 
has been both difficult and challenging. There is precious little 
American experience to draw on for such an effort, and when the 
campaign, to its credit, attracted support from a broad range of 
concerned parties, it was hard to keep labor and community 
interests in the forefront. 
Based on our trials and errors, we would like to offer some 
practical insights for the benefit of others who 'may become 
involved in similar campaigns. We highly recommend union and 
community involvement in such efforts. If working people and 
community groups are to gain power in saving manufacturing jobs 
and developing this country's future industrial policy we need 
•Greg LeRoy is research director of the Midwest Center for Labor Research (MCLRJ. 
Lynn Feekin is director of the Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs. The Calumet 
Project is a joint effort ofMCLR and the United Citizens Organization (UCOJ, which 
is a community group made up of churches and unions in East Chicago, Indiana. 
The Project has been active in the steel and railcar industries, and has initiated 
a union-based Early Warning Network against plant closings in the Calumet region. 
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to seize every opportunity for involving ourselves in local 
economic development decision-making. 
Generating a Conversion Feasibility Study 
Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Machinery Company in East 
Chicago, Indiana, makes the largest steel castings in the United 
States. Traditionally one of the country's few builders of steel mills, 
the plant also makes vital parts for ships, pipelines, railcars and 
mining equipment. With over 200 machinists in the 1970s, it was 
one of the largest machine shops in the Midwest. 
Blaw-Knox was bought in 1968 by White Consolidated 
Industries, a diversified machinery and appliance conglomerate 
based in Cleveland. Through the 1970s and early 1980s, White 
diverted much of the profit from Blaw-Knox and other machinery 
subsidiaries into its high-growth home appliances division. As the 
demand for steel mills declined, White put all its East Chicago 
eggs in the Pentagon's basket by tooling up to supply General 
Dynamics with the armor hulls and turrets for the M-60 military 
tank. Despite the fact that the Pentagon committed the Army to 
the new M-l tank in 1976 and began taking delivery of the new 
model in 1980, White kept the East Chicago plant producing the 
M-60, relying on foreign orders. At times, the company used the 
uncertainty of new foreign orders for the M-60 to gain leverage 
for concessions, but United Steelworkers Local 1026 resisted 
givebacks, even during the Basic Steel contract concessions of 
1982. 
Monitoring metal-working trade journals, in Spring 1984 the 
Calumet Project found that White Consolidated had just 
announced a new corporate strategy, setting a hurdle rate for 
profits which none of its heavy machinery divisions could hope 
to meet. We immediately alerted Local 1026. Blaw-Knox was for 
sale, and the only order then on the books would not carry work 
past the end of the year. 
Throughout the summer of 1984, Local 1026 and the Calumet 
Project sought to find out the plant's prospects; inquiries were 
made to the Pentagon about future orders, contact was made with 
the UAW at General Dynamics, and White's past investment 
strategies and labor practices were researched. White publicly 
denied that Blaw-Knox was for sale. In retrospect, the company 
was doing what the manuals advise when a plant is in trouble: 
deny it as long as you can so you don't lose your workforce and 
disrupt production. Employment, which only seven years ago was 
over 2,200, had dropped to 1,200 by January 1984 and by the end 
of that year was less than 600. 
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Skeptical steelworkers listen as Arthur D. Little consultant (standing, left) 
answers charges that the union was being ignored in Little's feasibility 
study. 
Local 1026 President Buck Martin and other executive board 
members responded cautiously to the news of White's changing 
strategy, not wanting to alarm their members unless they were 
sure the trouble was real. It took another jolt to move them to 
action; in September 1984 White announced the machine shop 
would be closed, claiming that department was unprofitable. 
Board members were bitter, alleging that the company had been 
turning away work for that department; that young, inexperienced 
supervisors had alienated the shop's skilled workers; and that 
White had failed to reinvest in new machinery or adequate 
maintenance. 
The union responded quickly, sending out a letter to local, 
regional, state and federal officials, detailing the plant's conditions, 
the lack of new orders, and White's new corporate strategy. It 
called for a meeting to plan against a shutdown. The union formed 
an internal committee to defend its interests. Under pressure from 
the union's charges, White finally announced in October that 
Blaw-Knox was for sale. 
The union's letter defined the task at hand: since White had no 
plans for future production at the plant, a feasibility study was 
needed to determine what alternative products the plant could 
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be converted to make. In a hectic round of fall meetings, chaired 
by Steelworkers District 31 Director Jack Parton, the union pulled 
together a coalition to back such a feasibility study. The coalition 
included the Development Director of East Chicago, the United 
Citizens Organization (UCO), representatives from the 
Congressman and U.S. Senators, the State of Indiana Department 
of Commerce, the Blaw-Knox plant manager, the regional planning 
commission, and the local dislocated workers program. A 
subcommittee made up of the union, UCO, the city, the planning 
commission and the plant manager was formed to raise funds and 
draft a Request for Proposals. By Christmas, more than $50,000 
had been committed by the state, the city, the company, the local 
union, the international union, a veteran's lodge, UCO, and the 
local economic development commission. 
Five bids were received and reviewed in January, and a contract 
was signed between the city and the consulting firm of Arthur 
D Little and Company (ADL) in March 1985. The consultants met 
with various groups to gather information during April and May, 
and delivered their report in early July. 
With this basic chronology of the Blaw-Knox feasibility study 
process, we would like to examine the strengths and weaknesses 
of the campaign and offer some suggestions for other unions or 
community groups who may find themselves in a similar situation. 
The Union Must Be Organized First 
A union "Save Our Jobs" Committee is essential to any 
conversion effort. The committee at Local 1026 was a vital source 
of news about the plant's condition, a sounding board and catalyst 
for ideas and strategies, a voice for the rank and file from the 
various departments and a vocal ally for the union leadership to 
be more aggressive in both private and public meetings. 
The committee within Local 1026 was active, but in retrospect, 
it was too small. When we tried to do a survey of workers in the 
plant to get their ideas on alternate uses and products, the response 
was poor, partly because no grievers or rank and file had been 
part of the process of initiating the poll or developing the 
questionnaire. 
The "Save Our Jobs" Committee played a very important role, 
however. The presence of members at meetings of the public 
coalition made an enormous difference: they were impatient and 
aggressive, they demanded action for the money the union had 
chipped in, and when they criticized the plant manager's 
performance to his face, they made it clear the union was not going 
to be passive about the process. 
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Beware the Bidding Process 
Developing a Request for Proposals (RFP) and the solicitation 
and awarding of bids for a community-initiated feasibility study 
is a delicate process which requires careful attention. It's that 
critical first step when things get put down in writing that can 
backfire later if adequate safeguards for labor and community 
interests are not built in. The scope of services and the way those 
services will be provided are the crucial points. 
Since there are only a few labor/community-oriented consulting 
firms, it's smart to assume that the bid will likely go to a 
mainstream business consulting firm with no experience work-
ing for a grass-roots constituency. That means written protections 
should be built into the RFP. We suggest the following safeguards: 
—A specified role for the union in the research process, 
including regularly scheduled meetings between the consultants 
and the union's executive board or the Save Our Jobs Committee, 
and public meetings with the membership during and at the end 
of the study. 
—Guaranteed equal access to all corporate information used 
by the consultants as a basis for their recommendations. 
—Guaranteed full participation rights in any meetings with 
development officials or others involved in the process. 
—Inclusion of a social cost analysis on the impact of the job 
loss. 
—A requirement that reinvestment in the plant (or lack of it) 
be documented, including an inventory of equipment and 
machinery which includes ages, and an itemization, including 
value, of all improvements made in the plant over the past ten 
years. (The ADL report on Blaw-Knox unwittingly supported the 
union's charge that the plant had been "milked," when it showed 
that most of the machinery was so old it had only scrap value.) 
—A proviso that if labor costs are to become an issue in the 
study, management competence and past performance must also 
be scrutinized. Interviews with union-designated workers should 
be a primary source of information. (It was particularly frustrating 
during the ADL study that wage rates were considered fair game 
for review, but when union members asked the consultants to look 
into major management errors, the ADL staff shrugged their 
shoulders and said "That's the past, we're just trying to determine 
what can be done in the future." Never mind that current wages 
and benefits reflect past good faith bargaining, or that past 
management practices affect future prospects.) 
Labor and community groups should try to exercise as much 
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control as possible over who gets the job. One possible method 
is to dominate the funding. When that is not possible, the next 
best move is to solicit as many friendly bidders as possible to 
increase the odds. While the sub-committee drafted the RFP, we 
contacted three firms with labor/community experience and 
encouraged them to bid. Unfortunately, only one was able to 
respond. That really narrowed our chances and gave us little room 
to maneuver in advocating for a friendly bid. 
When the bids came in, the Project scrambled to investigate the 
four mainstream business consulting firms. Thanks to research 
by Indiana University-Fort Wayne Professor Mark Crouch, we were 
able to alert some committee members about one of the bidders, 
the Fantus Corporation. Fantus contributes in a big way to the 
hypermobility of manufacturing capital, by playing both sides of 
the fence (working for both cities and corporations) in the regional 
rotation game of industry relocation. Fantus also has an anti-union 
history. It was difficult gaining access to information about the 
other consultants' past relations with unions and communities, 
and despite fairly extensive checking, we really had no luck in 
determining if the other three firms had skeletons in their closets. 
Committee Structures Influence Knowledge and Power 
Bringing in so many diverse people and organizations to the 
feasibility study process was a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, the Blaw-Knox effort brought many people to work together 
who in the past had not cooperated. It also insured very high 
visibility for the efforts to save the plant, and provided necessary 
connections and "peer pressure" to raise money for the study. But 
opening up the process also made it difficult for the local union 
to maintain control of its own fate. This was especially true when 
the working subcommittee was formed; it was chaired not by the 
union, but by the business director for the regional planning 
commission. Even when the whole committee met to hear of the 
subcommittee's progress, the power of greatest knowledge was 
with the planning commission business director, rather than the 
union. Steelworkers District Director Parton chaired the larger 
committee, but he was not close enough to the tasks at hand to 
dominate the proceedings. The Steelworkers staff representative 
was skeptical of the whole process and never became active. The 
fact that the USWA International contributed only 10 percent of 
the funding for the study also possibly diluted its power. 
The presence of the plant manager on the committee was also 
a source of tension. On the one hand, it apparently indicated that 
White/Blaw-Knox wanted to cooperate in the effort. Still, he came 
from the company 
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' in the effort. Still, he came 
from the company which had milked the facility. He claimed he 
was there not as a representative of White, but rather as an 
interested party, and he once said he was considering buying the 
plant himself. The development officials, whose work circles are 
dominated by business people, saw no conflict in his participation, 
and routinely deferred to him for information about the plant. This 
roused the ire of some unionists, who had specific complaints of 
mismanagement against the plant manager. Some worried he 
might seek to cover up his past mistakes by interfering with the 
feasibility study process. 
Public Meetings For Education 
and Coalition-Building 
The Calumet Project and Local 1026 organized two public 
meetings on Blaw-Knox, one in December when the study was 
commissioned and another in May, halfway through the study. 
The meetings were an attempt to open up the process to both 
workers and community residents, to help build public support 
for the effort, and to demystify a process which usually takes place 
behind closed corporate doors. 
The first meeting, in early December 1984, drew more than 200 
people, including more than half the first shift. After various 
officials explained that a study was being sought, workers spoke 
out: some were angry at White Consolidated; others were scared 
about losing their jobs. Several criticized the company for denying 
the plant was in trouble; others argued the plant would surely get 
new orders. (In fact, a new order from Taiwan was confirmed a 
few weeks later, keeping the foundry alive until July, 1985). There 
was an uneasy consensus that the union's new allies were probably 
doing the right thing, but the idea of a publicly initiated feasibility 
study was new. Many workers were skeptical, and many 
continued to deny the plant was in serious danger of closing. 
The second meeting, in early May 1985, was called to allow the 
consultants from Arthur D. Little (ADL) to report on their 
preliminary findings and to allow union members to give input. 
After a brief presentation in which the ADL men confirmed that 
the future market for the M-60 was sporadic at best, workers 
moved to complain about ADLs neglect of the union. "We asked 
twice that you come out and talk to workers in the plant," yelled 
a union trustee. "To me, it's a one-sided approach." Several workers 
also said that they expected the report to blame the plant's troubles 
on high wages and that they refused to discuss large concessions. 
Numerous examples of mismanagement were cited. One veteran 
worker waved his arms fervently, saying, "We've seen everything 
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that can be cast come out of this plant, from belt buckles to fence 
posts to steel mills. We can make anything in there if you'll get 
management out of the way." 
With the union so emphatic about wanting to be involved in 
the feasibility study, the consultants agreed. For the remaining 
month of their research, ADL sought out unionists' expertise. 
Union board members, rather than foremen, gave the consultants 
tours of the machine shop and the roll shop. 
Learning the Ropes From Community Groups 
Compared to most community groups, the average union local's 
leadership knows very little about their city's economic 
development process. This is a result of the traditional 
estrangement between the development community and the labor 
movement. When East Chicago's business development director 
heard that Blaw-Knox was in trouble, she was surprised; the plant 
stands two blocks from her office. But then, she had never asked 
the union. 
Because most community groups have extensive experience 
working on development issues (based on work around housing, 
public improvements and jobs), they can provide a bridge for 
unions to quickly gain an effective voice with development 
officials. The fact that UCO was at the union's side from the 
beginning undoubtedly made the city officials more attentive, 
since UCO has effectively organized on housing, unemployment 
and school issues for the past four years. With their experience, 
UCO leaders and staff were the union's most adept allies in both 
committee and public meetings. 
Social Cost Analysis: 
A Key Research Tool 
Social cost analysis is the best way to.dramatize how the 
community has material links to the plant and the union. UCO 
leaders were alarmed when the ripple effects of losing 800 jobs 
at Blaw-Knox were spelled out to them: 534 additional jobs, $30.9 
million annually in lost personal income, $ 12 million in lost tax 
revenues, and $7.8 million in higher government payments for 
the unemployed. Plus, Blaw-Knox was delinquent in its property 
and real estate taxes; in 1984, it owed the City of East Chicago 
over $621,000 in back taxes needed for school, police, fire and 
sanitation services (despite making steady profits estimated 
between 22 and 29 percent). 
These figures were only used privately by Local 1026 in the first 
committee meeting, to underscore the urgency of acting to save 
the jobs. Had the committee 
union could have made the 
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the jobs. Had the committee members not been so responsive, the 
union could have made the figures public, in an effort to pressure 
the officials into action. Such studies usually get very good press 
coverage. 
Conversion Means Different Things 
to Different People 
Conversion is popularly viewed as the peace movement's way 
to gain labor support for reduced military spending. For all but 
a few members of USWA Local 1026, however, the issue was 
always jobs, not peace. 
The feasibility study was not a conscious question of conversion] 
it was a matter of reversion, going back to the varied product mix 
the plant had before White banked on high profitable but 
precarious military work. Early on, the Calumet Project sought 
information on other union campaigns to convert military 
facilities, much of which is from a disarmament perspective. 
Materials were gathered on the Lucas Aerospace stewards program 
in England and the United Electrical Workers campaign in 
Charleston. We consulted the Highlander Center's book on how 
to research military contractors, and Joel Yudken of the Center 
for Economic Conversion gave a seminar for local leaders based 
on his experience with the UAW at McDonnell-Douglas in 
California. 
Some workers at the plant actively advocated the military work. 
Warm-up jackets with a mighty M-60 emblazoned on the back 
were sported at the public meetings. Others cynically joked about 
new trouble in the Middle East because the Arab-Israeli conflicts 
of the 1970s had produced lots of new tank orders. 
Toward a Labor/Community Industrial Agenda 
Any union or community group which becomes involved in a 
conversion campaign should expect many such tensions as we 
experienced between the union, company, development and 
elected officials, and the consultants. Any broad-based effort will 
necessarily bring together parties with differing self-interests. 
That's no reason to avoid getting involved, though. The key is to 
know what you want and to organize to defend your position. If 
the thinking of local, state and federal development officials is to 
be influenced toward more creative, pro-labor and pro-community 
policies, many more of them need to be invited out of the city 
hall and out of the company board room to get an earful down 
at the union hall and the church basement. • 
